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Context: Post-release user feedback plays an integral role in 
improving software quality and informing new features. Given its 
growing importance, feedback concerning security enhancements 
is particularly noteworthy. In considering the rapid uptake of 
Android we have examined the scale and severity of Android 
security threats as reported by its stakeholders. Objective: We 
systematically mine Android issue logs to derive insights into 
stakeholder perceptions and experiences in relation to certain 
Android security issues. Method: We employed contextual 
analysis techniques to study issues raised regarding confidentiality 
and privacy in the last three major Android releases, considering 
covariance of stakeholder comments, and the level of consistency 
in user preferences and priorities. Results: Confidentiality and 
privacy concerns varied in severity, and were most prevalent over 
Jelly Bean releases. Issues raised in regard to confidentiality 
related mostly to access, user credentials and permission 
management, while privacy concerns were mainly expressed about 
phone locking. Community users also expressed divergent 
preferences for new security features, ranging from more relaxed 
to very strict. Conclusions: Strategies that support continuous 
corrective measures for both old and new Android releases would 
likely maintain stakeholder confidence. An approach that provides 
users with basic default security settings, but with the power to 
configure additional security features if desired, would provide 
the best balance for Android’s wide cohort of stakeholders. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.2.9 [Software Engineering]: Management. 
General Terms: Quality, Security, Performance. 
Keywords: Android, Security, Confidentiality, Privacy, 
Content Analysis, Empirical Analysis. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Post-release end-user feedback plays an integral role in improving 
software quality [1]. Through end-users’ feedback developers are 
able to gauge their sentiments about released products. In some 
instances users are also able to rate software, which may inform 
other users’ decisions. Furthermore, apart from improving the 
quality of previously deployed software features, post-release 
feedback also signals other desired functionality, and so can direct 
a software product’s evolution. Insights from highly successful 
cases could identify critical success factors for others. 
The Android operating system (OS) has arguably become the 
most widely adopted mobile OS [2]. In recent times, however, 
there has been growing unease regarding the quality of the 
Android platform [3]. In particular, security-related concerns have 
become the focus of user reviews [3]. This is driven, in part, by 
the increasing capabilities of mobile devices, with users now able 
to store non-trivial amounts of private data on their mobile 
handsets, along with the greater use of mobile devices in 
corporate settings under bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policies. 
Given the critical role security plays in assessments of software 
quality [4], there is need for research to explore how such issues 
have affected the Android OS. Beyond uncovering post-release 
insights into a highly successful software product, such 
explorations could also provide direction to developers in terms of 
employing suitable precision when developing countermeasures 
for particular security threats. In addition, insights regarding the 
scale and severity of various Android security threats could ensure 
new customer awareness. In order to ascertain the possible utility 
of such a study we conducted a preliminary analysis of the 
Android community’s concerns and found that 79% of Android 
users’ security-related comments related to either confidentiality 
or privacy. Understanding the nature of these issues, whether they 
covary, and any variance in the community’s preferences and 
priorities, could usefully inform remedial efforts. 
While the Android OS and its in-built issue tracker have attracted 
previous research efforts, there has been a tendency towards 
manifest (surface) level analysis [5, 6]. We believe that, though 
useful, such efforts only reveal a part of the picture, and so should 
be supplemented by deeper contextual analyses. Moving beyond 
analyses based on word use frequency, qualitative forms of 
contextual analysis enable researchers to assess communicators’ 
intentions and the implications of these intentions on a process or 
construct [7]. Such an approach would therefore help us to 
unpack the details reported in the Android issue tracker, and 
provide insights into the abovementioned issues. We therefore 
used contextual analysis approaches to examine the details of 
Android issues as logged by stakeholders over the last three major 
Android OS releases: Ice Cream Sandwich (4.0, 4.03), Jelly Bean 
(4.1, 4.2, 4.3) and KitKat (4.4). We provide empirical evidence of 
the nature and scale of confidentiality and privacy issues facing 
 
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are 
not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that 
copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights 
for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be 
honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or 
republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior 
specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from 
Permissions@acm.org.  
 
EASE '15, April 27 - 29, 2015, Nanjing, China  
Copyright 2015 ACM 978-1-4503-3350-4/15/04…$15.00  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/2745802.2745819 
 
the Android community, how the mix of these issues changed 
over the three releases, and stakeholders’ expressed preferences 
and competing concerns. Our contributions are threefold, and 
should support quality improvements: we discuss our findings in 
relation to previous evidence and technical opinions, we identify 
strategies for counterbalancing various stakeholders’ demands for 
fixes, and we outline implications for the mobile community. 
In the next section we provide our study background and state our 
research questions, and we then describe our research setting in 
Section 3. In Section 4 we present our results, and in Section 5 we 
discuss our findings and outline potential strategies. We then 
consider the threats to the work in Section 6, before outlining 
implications for the mobile community and providing concluding 
remarks in Section 7. 
2. BACKGROUND AND QUESTIONS 
There is clearly a strong imperative for software producers to 
consider post-release reviews of their products. Previous work 
considering the acceptance of users’ concerns and opinions on 
such products has long established that software (and any 
associated hardware) is most successful when end-user feedback 
is accommodated [8, 9]. Literature examining the relationship 
between end-users’ participation and software product success has 
also linked the acceptance of end-user feedback to their 
satisfaction with or acceptance of the product [10]. Willingness to 
accommodate end-user feedback has also been shown to affect the 
influence of the delivered system on the end-user community [11]. 
In delivering and sustaining software product quality, security-
related issues may be particularly noteworthy, as they are likely to 
require urgent action from developers. Previous studies have lent 
some support to this proposition. For instance, Zaman et al. [4] 
compared developers’ focus on security and performance bugs in 
Firefox and found that security bugs were favored for fixing over 
those that were performance-related, and were fixed much more 
quickly. Critical security bugs have also been removed from the 
Android issue list to avoid or reduce exacerbation or exploitation 
of such issues [12]. 
At the core of the Android OS stack is a modified Linux 2.6 
monolithic kernel, with Java applications running on a virtual 
machine [2]. Among the software programs that are shipped as 
part of the Android OS, the Contacts application, Email client, 
Web and Map browsers and Messaging application are those most 
frequently included in vendor instantiations. Multiple handset 
vendors collaborate with Google through the Open Handset 
Alliance (OHA), extending these applications (i.e., how the 
features appear), and the basic Android OS, to suit their hardware 
offerings. Companies such as HTC, Samsung, LG and Sony are 
among the device manufactures that offer Android phones, while 
Sprint, Verizon, T-Mobile and AT&T offer services for Android 
devices. These communities, along with other developer groups, 
regular end-users, and Google itself, use the Android OS issue 
tracker to report post-release issues and request enhancements to 
features. Thus, the Android issue tracker provides the interface 
between the Android OS (as the product), the producers of the 
product (the Google developer community) and the consumers of 
the product (device vendors, app and service developers and end-
users of Android devices). 
Researchers have thus examined this interface to understand 
various aspects of the Android OS. For instance, Kumar Maji et 
al. [13] studied issues reported for four early versions of the 
Android OS (versions 1.1, 1.5, 1.6 and 2.0) and found most 
defects to be present in the application layer. Guana et al. [5] 
classified 8,597 Android OS issues in four layers of this OS 
(application framework, library, android runtime and Linux 
kernel), omitting those that were suspected to be in the application 
layer. They found higher levels of defect concentration in the 
framework and kernel layers.  Guana et al. [5] suggested that this 
prevalence of defects closer to the OS kernel may be linked to 
hardware compatibility issues. 
As noted in Section 1, with security being seen as central to user 
perceptions of software quality [4], leading in part to growing 
interest in the security of mobile OSs [12, 14], it would seem 
timely to explore and provide understandings for the nature of 
Android security-related issues, how stakeholders’ views covary, 
and various users’ preferences and priorities with respect to 
changes. Such insights would provide indirect understandings 
around the attention that is given to such issues by the 
community. Furthermore, with Android devices leading mobile 
device sales [2], understanding the frequency with which security 
issues are raised in the current Android OS offerings would likely 
support users’ confidence. We thus examine confidentiality and 
privacy issues raised on the Android issue tracker in order to 
answer the following questions: 
RQ1. What is the scale of confidentiality and privacy issues raised 
for the Android OS versions? 
RQ2. Are specific versions of Android OS more issue-prone than 
others? 
RQ3. Are stakeholder views regarding confidentiality and privacy 
issues homogeneous or are they likely to create dilemmas for 
Android developers? 
3. RESEARCH SETTING 
Issues identified by the Android community are submitted to the 
Android OS issue tracker hosted by Google; refer to 
http://code.google.com/p/android/issues/list.  Among the data that 
is stored in the issue tracker are the following details: Issue ID, 
Type, Status, Owner, Summary description, Stars (number of 
people following the issue), Priority, Milestone, Attachments, 
Open date, Close date, Reporter, Reporter Role, Project, 
Component, and OS Version. We extracted a snapshot of the issue 
tracker, comprising 21,547 issues logged between January 2008 
and March 2014. These issues were then imported into a database, 
and thereafter, we performed data cleaning by executing 
previously written scripts to remove all HTML tags and foreign 
characters [15, 16], and particularly those in the Summary 
description field, to avoid confounding of our analysis. 
We next employed exploratory data analysis (EDA) techniques to 
investigate the data properties and to facilitate anomaly detection. 
We observed that issues were labelled as defect (15,750 issues), 
enhancement (5,354 issues) and others (5 issues); and 438 issues 
had no type (being null). Issues had one of six statuses: new 
(18,891 issues), needsinfo (143 issues), unassigned (476 issues), 
assigned (2,001 issues), resolvedbyuser (1 issue) and accepted (32 
issues). Three issues also had the null status. Issues had 140 
different owners. They were logged mostly by those identifying 
themselves as users (9,006 issues) and developers (7,804 issues); 
with some 4,737 issues being entered anonymously. Issues were 
reported for 13 different components, although for most of the 
issues reported this field was left blank (15,711 issues altogether). 
We observed that only 2,816 issues had the version field updated 
(out of the total 21,547 issues), while the others were left blank. 
Given this, we did not perform extensive analysis on data columns 
with missing values. 
We examined the data of each issue in our database to correlate 
these with the commercial releases of the Android OS (refer to 
http://www.android.com).  Its first release was in September 2008 
(http://android-developers.blogspot.co.nz/2008/09/announcing-
android-10-sdk-release-1.html/), while the first issue was logged 
in the issue tracker in January 2008. This suggests that the 
community was already actively engaged with the Android OS 
after the release of the first beta version in November 2007 (refer 
to http://android-developers.blogspot.be/2007/11/android-first-
week.html/), with issues being reported just two months after the 
first beta release. Given this level of active engagement and issue 
identification, occurring even before the official Android OS 
release, we partitioned the issues based on Android OS release 
date and major name change. So, for instance, all of the issues 
logged from January 2008 (the date of the first issue that was 
entered on the issue tracker) to February 2009 (the date of one of 
the Android releases before a major name change was made) were 
labelled as ‘Early versions’, reflecting the period of the Android 
OS releases 1.0 and 1.1 which were both without formal names. 
The subsequent partition comprised the period between Android 
OS version 1.1 and Cupcake (Android version 1.5), and so on. 
Table 1 provides a summary of the numbers of issues that were 
logged between each of the major releases, from the very first 
commercial release (and using the release date of the first beta 
version to compute the first entry) to KitKat – Android version 
4.4. From column three of Table 1 (Number of days between 
releases) it is noted that the time taken between the delivery of 
most of Android OS’s major releases (those involving a name 
change) fell between 80 and 156 days, with three of the ten 
releases (Early versions, Gingerbread and Jelly Bean) falling 
outside this range. The fourth column of Table 1 (Total issues 
logged) shows that the number of issues reported increased 
somewhat as the Android OS progressed, with this rise being 
particularly evident when the mean number of issues reported per 
day for each release is considered (refer to the values in the fifth 
column for details). Over the six years of Android OS’s existence, 
on average, 9.6 issues were logged every day (median = 4.4, Std 
Dev = 13.6). 
As noted in Sections 1 and 2, we were especially interested in the 
security (confidentiality and privacy) issues that were reported for 
the last three releases (as per the highlighted cells in Table 1). Our 
selection of these three releases is driven by continued consumer 
demand for these offerings (http://www.cnet.com/news/kitkat-
chews-up-more-than-20-percent-of-android-devices/), and by our 
wish to provide actionable recommendations for the mobile 
stakeholder community. We discuss the approach used for 
extracting security-related issues and our analysis methods in the 
next three subsections. 
3.1 Classifying Security Issues 
Bhattacharya et al. [12] identified 980 bug reports in the Android 
OS by querying words such as “security”, “vulnerability”, 
“attack”, “crash”, “buffer overflow” and “buffer overrun”. Other 
security terms included under the ISO9126 quality model 
functionality category, and used by Hindle et al. [6] in their 
evaluation of MaxDB and MySQL, include “exploit”, 
“certificate”, “secured”, “malicious” and “trustworthy”. The 
mainstream OS literature generally considers multiple areas of 
security, including privacy, confidentiality, integrity, availability 
and reliability [17, 18]. Privacy denotes a state of being free from 
intrusion; confidentiality relates to limiting unauthorized access. 
Integrity denotes freedom from corruption; the state of being 
available is defined as being accessible. Finally, reliability denotes 
the state of being dependable. We anticipated that a classification 
scheme considering these five areas would capture a broader 
spectrum of security issues than had been considered in previous 
studies (e.g., refer to [12]), and would also provide more granular 
separation of security issues, although the terms considered under 
each area still converge with those of the ISO9126 quality model. 
Informed by these various threads in the literature we thus created 
the classification scheme covering these five areas (shown in 
Table 2) to classify Android OS security issues. 
We tokenized the Summary description field of the issues into 
word unigrams and, based on the classification scheme in Table 2, 
we then extracted all of the security-related issues in our snapshot 
of the Android issue tracker. We then visualized these results, 
which revealed that, of the security-related concerns captured by 
our protocol, those relating to privacy (36.7%) and confidentiality 
(42.1%) dominated the issues raised, as depicted in Figure 1. We 
thus scrutinize these two subsets of issues using the following 
contextual analysis approaches. 
3.2 Conventional Content Analysis 
Our classification scheme in Table 2 identified 510 issues relating 
to confidentiality and 1103 privacy-related issues in the Android 
issue tracker over the last three OS releases (Ice Cream Sandwich, 
Jelly Bean and KitKat). We first selected the smaller sample of 
510 confidentiality issues for open coding using conventional 
content analysis. In this phase of coding we decided to use a 
bottom-up approach, where codes were derived from the issues as 
against using a predefined coding scheme. Researchers employing 
such an approach generally start the process of data analysis by 
inductively examining the data, allowing meaning to flow from 
the data, as against approaching data analysis with any 
preconceptions [19]. Two coders (the first author and another 
trained coder) initially perused 5% of the confidentiality issues 
(26 in total), and assigned each to a topic. During this exercise it 
was observed that, quite frequently, each issue addressed a single 
topic, and was of four types: 1. Feature does not work as intended; 
2. Feature violating constraint; 3. Need for new feature; or 4. 
Feature does not work (see summary categories, examples and 
frequencies in Table 3). In addition, we observed that issues 
categorized as enhancement requests (i.e., 3. Need for new 
feature) sometimes reflected competing concerns, which would 
have the potential to create dilemmas for developers in terms of 
their deciding on appropriate fixes. We then recoded all 1613 
issues in a formal coding phase (around 5% had dual concerns), 
with each issue being assigned to one of the four types just noted 
(refer to Table 3 for a summary). We then performed formal 
reliability assessment, which revealed that there was 88% inter-
rater agreement between the two coders as measured using 
Holsti’s coefficient of reliability measurement (C.R) [20]. The 
remaining coding differences were discussed and resolved by 
consensus. Our reliability measure represents excellent agreement 
between coders and suggests that a consistent and reliable 
approach was being taken. The enhancement requests (those 
issues that were coded as Scale 3 in Table 3) were then probed 
further using the analysis approach outlined next (refer to Section 
3.3). Prior to conducting this additional round of analysis on the 
enhancement requests, however, we undertook a number of 
landscape analyses to extract meaning from the issues raised, the 
results of which are provided in Sections 4.1.1 and 4.2.1. 
3.3 Dilemma Analysis 
As noted above, during our content analysis confidentiality and 
privacy issues that suggested new features and directions for 
improving the Android OS were coded as enhancements. 
However, informal perusal of these enhancements also revealed 
that there were some conflicting requests from the Android 
stakeholders. Our first round of content analysis did not capture 
these interpretations fully, but was instead closer to the surface of 
the issues. We anticipated, however, that a deeper examination of 
these conflicting requests would reveal competing concerns in the 
Android community. Dilemma analysis, often referred to as the 
sociological conception of contradiction, can be used to unpack 
opposing points of view [21]. This approach guides the analysis 
of transcripts to extract issues about which individuals hold 
opinions. In our context, while the issues were not recorded as 
transcripts as such, the enhancement requests contained sufficient 
detail to enable us to both identify the new feature requested and 
the potential benefit of having such a feature. Thus, it was 
straightforward for us to identify competing concerns among such 
issues. We thus examined each enhancement request, paying close 
attention to those that conflicted with other issues. These results 
are provided in Sections 4.1.2 and 4.2.2. 
4. RESULTS 
We separate the results for the two sets of security issues in 
Sections 4.1 and 4.2. We first present our findings for the 
confidentiality-related issues in Section 4.1. We then provide our 
findings for those related to privacy in Section 4.2. 
4.1 Confidentiality-Related Issues 
We first outline the results from our conventional content analysis 
in Section 4.1.1. We then examine the competing concerns in 
Android stakeholders’ confidentiality-related enhancement 
requests, and provide these results in Section 4.1.2. 
4.1.1 Content Analysis: Confidentiality 
Of the 510 confidentiality-related issues raised on the Android 
issue tracker, stakeholders identifying themselves as users 
registered 224 complaints, those registered as developers lodged 
187 concerns and another 99 issues were recorded anonymously. 
The largest number of confidentiality issues were labelled as 
defects (388), and 122 issues were logged as enhancements. 
Figure 2 (a) shows how these issues were distributed by 
confidentiality terms overall (refer to Table 2 for details), where it 
is revealed that issues related to access, username, password and 
permission dominated these concerns in the Android issue tracker 
over the latter three major releases (Ice Cream Sandwich, Jelly 
Bean and KitKat). A Pearson Chi-square test was conducted to 
ascertain whether the differences observed in Figure 2 (a) were 
statistically significant. The results of the Chi-square test confirm 
that there were significant differences in the types of issues that 
were recorded on the Android issue tracker, and particularly for 
the higher levels of  access-, password-, and permission-related 
issues that were logged (X2 = 68.08, df = 36, p < 0.01). 
Given this finding, we considered how those issues were 
distributed across the three releases concerned, and depict the 
results in Figure 2 (b). Here it is shown that most issues were 
raised over the course of the Jelly Bean releases, with concerns 
about access, login/username, password, permission and 
verification dominating those issues recorded. We also observe in 
Figure 2 (b) that there has been heightened concern about 
restriction since the last Android release (KitKat), and that 
between the periods of the release of the Ice Cream Sandwich and 
Jelly Bean versions stakeholders recorded the fewest 
confidentiality-related issues. We again performed a Pearson Chi-
square test to ascertain whether the differences observed in Figure 
2 (b) were statistically significant, considering the seven most 
popular issues in Figure 2 (b) in our test. Our Chi-square test 
confirms that there were significant differences in the number of 
and types of confidentiality issues recorded over the latter three 
major versions of the Android OS (X2 = 25.44, df = 6, p < 0.01). 
We present a finer grained analysis of these results in Table 4, 
considering the frequency (including percentages – though we 
caution on the interpretation of percentages given the low 
frequency of some issues) of issues for the most regularly reported 
access, password and permission confidentiality concerns. 
Notwithstanding the differences in frequencies, Table 4 shows 
that for the access category, there was substantial variation in the 
mean number of issues raised over the Jelly Bean releases when 
compared to those noted after the release of Ice Cream Sandwich 
and KitKat (67.9% and 74.1% compared to 9.4% and 7.4% for Ice 
Cream Sandwich and 22.6% and 18.5% for KitKat respectively). 
Table 1. Android OS issues over the major releases 
Version (Release) Last release date 




Mean issues per 
day 
Early versions (1.0, 1.1) 09/02/2009 451 262* 0.6 
Cupcake (1.5) 30/04/2009 80 101 1.3 
Donut (1.6) 15/09/2009 138 266 1.9 
Éclair (2.0, 2.01, 2.1) 12/01/2010 119 464 3.9 
Froyo (2.2) 20/05/2010 128 490 3.8 
Gingerbread (2.3, 2.37) 09/02/2011 265 1,291 4.9 
Honeycomb (3.0, 3.1, 3.2) 15/07/2011 156 897 5.8 
Ice Cream Sandwich (4.0, 4.03) 16/12/2011 154 1,127 7.3 
Jelly Bean (4.1, 4.2, 4.3) 24/07/2013 586 12,148 20.7 
KitKat (4.4) 31/10/2013 99 4,501 45.5 
  
∑ = 2,176 ∑ = 21,547  = 9.6 
* Total number of issues logged between the first beta release on 16/11/2007 and Android version 1.1 released on 09/02/2009 
Table 2. Security labels and related terms 
Label Related terms 
Privacy authorization, phone lock, authentication, privacy, 
seclusion, separateness, isolation, conceal, secure, 
exploit, prevent, unauthorized, intrusion 
Confidentiality secret, classified, privy, permission,  password, 
confidential, vulnerable, access, grant, restrict, 
verify, privilege, username, login 
Integrity corrupt, disrepute, cohesion, coherence, soundness, 
wholeness, completeness, honest, license, integrity, 
attack, malicious, modification, identity, detection, 
sensitivity 
Availability accessible, convenient, buffer overflow, buffer 
overrun, crash, loss, destruction, available, obtain 
Reliability trust, reliable, dependable, stable, safe(ty), 
consistent, certification, validation, performance 
 
Figure 1. Android OS security issues 
Table 3. Coding categories and number of codes 
Scale Category/Characteristic Example Confidentiality Codes (%) Privacy Codes (%) 
1 Does not work as intended “Access to an account with two factor 
authentication persists after deleting app-
specific password used to attach to 
device” 
146 (28.6) 440 (39.9) 
2 Violating constraint “Accessing my call logs takes cool 4-5 
seconds” 
132 (25.9) 175 (15.9) 
3 Need for new feature “When installing an app: the security 
permission request to access contact 
details should be in red or orange and first 
in the list” 
130 (25.5) 285 (25.8) 
4 Does not work “Security exception when accessing 
account manager data from other apps 
signed with same keystore” 
102 (20) 203 (18.4) 
 
Figure 2. Android confidentiality issues 
While the logging of access-related complaints by stakeholders of 
Ice Cream Sandwich was below average for all four categories of 
codes recorded (Scales 1 to 4), since the release of KitKat users 
have logged more such issues (Scale 1 = 22.6%, Scale 2 = 25.6%, 
Scale 3 = 40.7% and Scale 4 = 18.5%). We observe in Table 4 
that 40.7% (or 24) of the requests for access-related features were 
recorded since the release of KitKat. While there were fewer 
password-related issues raised (as also seen in Figure 2 (a)), 
Scales 1 and 4 categories of codes were also highest after Jelly 
Bean releases (85.7% and 77.8% of the codes respectively). This 
trend of higher numbers of issues raised was replicated for 
permission-related issues. Most of the complaints coded Scale 3 
were submitted anonymously (100% for Ice Cream Sandwich, 
60% for Jelly Bean and 81.8% for KitKat), while users and 
developers recorded a similar pattern of codes across versions. 
We next take a detailed view of the confidentiality issues that 
were labelled as enhancement requests (Need for new feature), to 
assess the level of competing concerns faced by Google 
developers in delivering on stakeholders’ requests. 
4.1.2 Dilemma Analysis: Confidentiality 
We examined the 122 confidentiality enhancement requests to 
assess the level of stakeholders’ competing concerns. Of these, 57 
related to access, 6 related to username/login, 26 related to 
password, 25 related to permission, 4 related to restriction, 1 
related to secret and 3 to verification. Ninety-six issues were 
logged by anonymous users, 16 by developers and 9 by users. Of 
the confidentiality-related enhancement requests 12 were lodged 
for Ice cream Sandwich, 67 for Jelly Bean and 43 for KitKat, 
somewhat replicating the general pattern noted above. Given this 
small sample of enhancement requests we provide overall results, 
as against separating the data across versions. These results are 
summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5 reveals that four types of confidentiality concerns 
(regarding access, login, password and permission) demonstrated 
some form of divergence among stakeholders’ preferences, 
whereas issues related to restriction, secret and verification were 
homogeneous. In Table 5 it is shown that while some stakeholders 
were more cautious about how access to their data is managed, 
others were less worried. In fact, one user sought authorized 
access to stored contact details for some popular apps. On the 
other hand, another group of users was extremely cautious about 
any access being given to their contacts. Furthermore, while some 
users were happy to authorize use of their cellular data when there 
was no wifi connection, another group of stakeholders was 
seeking more granular control, for example, to be able to grant 
selected apps permission to use internet data but to restrict others. 
Table 5 shows that under the login confidentiality keyword there 
were two issues that saw major divergence: “automatic hotspot 
login” and “phone restore after wiping”. While some stakeholders 
desired the feature to login to hotspots automatically, others were 
against this feature, instead opting to trust only some private IPs. 
Such a split was also evident for the feature to login and restore 
handsets after wiping. This divergence also extended to the use of 
passwords. While some users favored caching passwords, 
removing passwords for some VPNs and making passwords 
visible, others were predisposed to password-protecting the use of 
wifi, mobile purchases, and even the phone shutdown (see 
examples in Table 5). For permission, there was greater leaning 
towards granular permission management. Although some users 
were less strict (e.g., “requesting the need for download without 
notification”), others felt that more granular permission would 
increase user confidence. 
4.2 Privacy-Related Issues 
We present the results from our analysis of the privacy-related 
issues in this section. First, the results from our conventional 
content analysis are provided in Section 4.2.1. We then examine 
the competing concerns in Android stakeholders’ privacy-related 
enhancement requests, and provide these results in Section 4.2.2. 
4.2.1 Content Analysis: Privacy 
Of the 1103 privacy-related issues recorded in our snapshot of the 
Android issue tracker, stakeholders identifying themselves as 
users registered 647 of these, developers lodged 221 issues and a 
further 235 were recorded anonymously. The largest number of 
privacy-related issues were labelled as defects (830 issues), while 
273 were logged as enhancements. Figure 3 (a) shows how these 
issues were distributed by terms that were classified under the 
privacy category, where it is revealed that issues related to 
authentication, lock and secure dominated the Android issue 
tracker over the latter three major releases. A Pearson Chi-square 
test was conducted to ascertain whether the differences observed 
in Figure 3 (a) were statistically significant. We first removed all 
the entries for terms that had a sample size of less than ten 
respective codes (the assumption for utilizing a Chi-square test) 
[22], before executing the test, which confirmed that there were 
significant differences in the types of privacy issues that were 
recorded on the Android issue tracker, and particularly for the 
higher numbers of  lock-related issues that were lodged (X2 = 
28.08, df = 9, p < 0.01). 
Table 4. Most regularly reported access, password and permission confidentiality concerns 
Version 
Access(%) Password(%) Permission(%) 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
ICS 5(9.4) 3(7.7) 1(1.7) 4(7.4) 2(4.8) 1(4.8) 6(21.4) 1(5.6) 2(9.1) 2(4.2) 3(12.0) 0(0) 
JB 36(67.9) 26(66.7) 34(57.6) 40(74.1) 36(85.7) 18(85.7) 14(50.0) 14(77.8) 18(81.8) 26(54.2) 17(68.0) 6(54.5) 
KK 12(22.6) 10(25.6) 24(40.7) 10(18.5) 4(9.5) 2(9.5) 8(28.6) 3(16.7) 2(9.1) 20(41.7) 5(20.0) 5(45.5) 
ICS=Ice Cream Sandwich, JB=Jelly Bean, KK=KitKat, Scale 1=Does not work as intended, Scale 2=Violating constraint, Scale 3=Need for new feature, Scale 4= Does not work 
Table 5. Confidentiality-related competing concerns 
Terms 
Competing concerns 
(Grant versus Restrict) 
Examples 
Access Access to other peripheral via USB, Access to 
contact details, Shared app access to 
microphone,  Apps access to cellular data if 
wifi not available, Access to SD Card, Network 
access, Internet access 
“Provide anonymized/hashed access to contact details/contacts for instant messagers like 
e.g. whatsapp, threema, etc.” +  “Enable cellular data when connected wifi access point 
doesn't provide internet connectivity” <<>> “When installing an app: the security 
permission request to access contact details should be in red or orange and first in the list.” 
+ “When roaming have an option to decide which apps can get internet access.” 
Login Automatic hotspot login, Phone (access) restore 
after wiping 
 “After fresh login of account (after wiping phone) there no option to configure auto 
download of apps by device / defer downloads” <<>> “Wipe after consecutive failed login 
attempts? verify human. enter android to continue” 
Password Cache password, Modify encryption pin, 
Remove VPN password for some wifi, Make 
password visible, Pin and password optional for 
VPN, Password protect wifi, Purchase via 
password protection, Shutdown with password 
“Allow for a simpler unlock password/pin than the password/passphrase used for full disk 
encryption” + “Enable slide unlock until timeout for pin, pattern, or password lock” <<>> 
“Different passwords for encryption and screen lock” + “User profiles - increase security 
by password protecting and segmenting” + “Password for purchases” + “provide a way to 
password-protect shutdown” 
Permission Google analytics without permission, Granular 
permission, Restrict app to local data, App 
accessing contacts - provide warning, Selected 
permission when installing apps, There is need 
for more granular permission, Reverse 
previously granted permission 
“Add download_without_notification to uses-permission drop-down” + “Use of google 
analytics without asking for internet permission.” <<>> “Some permissions are scary and 
for features people might never use. here's an idea on how to let users who wouldn't use 
some features still install and use an app.” + “Divide read_phone_state permission in two 
to provide more secure android for users” + “Permission request - reverse list” + “Ability 
to deny select permission upon app install” 
We next considered how those issues were distributed across the 
three releases of interest, depicted in Figure 3 (b). We plot the 
most prominent authentication, lock, privacy, secure and 
separate/seclude issues in Figure 3 (b), which reveals that most 
were logged over Jelly Bean releases, with issues for all of the five 
keyword categories just mentioned being dominated over this 
release. This pattern of results is similar to those that were 
revealed for confidentiality-related issues, where most were 
logged after Jelly Bean releases. We performed a second Pearson 
Chi-square test to ascertain whether the differences observed in 
Figure 3 (b) for the three Android releases were statistically 
significant, and particularly for the most prevalent lock and secure 
issues (comprising 72.4% and 10.3% of the issues overall). Our 
Chi-square test confirmed that there were significant differences 
in the number of lock and secure issues raised across the latter 
three versions of the Android OS (X2 = 17.23, df = 3, p < 0.01), 
Jelly Bean being the most problematic. Of note also is that the 
role (user, developer or anonymous) of those logging issues did 
not affect the pattern of results noted across versions. 
We take a more fine-grained look at the measures for lock and 
secure issues in Table 6, considering the frequency and scale 
(including percentages) of these concerns. We are particularly 
interested in features that did not work as intended (coded Scale 
1) or those that did not work altogether (coded Scale 4). Table 6 
shows that for the lock category, there were substantially more 
issues logged over Jelly Bean versions when compared to those 
recorded over Ice Cream Sandwich and KitKat (80.7% and 81.8% 
compared to 3.1% and 3.6% for Ice Cream Sandwich and 16.2% 
and 14.6% for KitKat respectively). Additionally, although of a 
smaller magnitude, secure issues were also most prevalent for 
Jelly Bean. On average, however, more secure issues were logged 
for Ice Cream Sandwich and KitKat (refer to Table 6). 
We next provide a detailed view of the privacy-related issues that 
were labelled as enhancement requests, to assess the level of 
competing privacy-related concerns. 
4.2.2 Dilemma Analysis: Privacy 
As in 4.1.2 above, we examined the 285 privacy-related issues 
that were logged as enhancement requests to determine Android 
stakeholders’ competing concerns. Of the set of privacy issues, 10 
related to authentication, 2 related to authorization, 187 were 
lock-related, 6 related to the prevent keyword, 13 had the privacy 
keyword, 7 related to restriction, 37 were associated with security 
and 23 with separation. Users logged 59 of these issues, 
developers logged 18, and 208 were entered anonymously. In 
terms of the distribution of enhancement requests across versions, 
19 were logged for Ice Cream Sandwich, 208 for Jelly Bean and 
58 for KitKat. We examined these issues for competing concerns, 
and observed that of the eight types of issues, only authentication-
, lock- and privacy-related enhancement requests had conflicting 
preferences. These are summarized in Table 7, which shows that 
for authentication, while some users were keen on enhancing 
Android’s authentication process, favoring a two stage approach, 
another set of users was in favor of simpler proxy-based 
authentication. Similarly, under the lock category there was 
divergence in relation to lock mode, the level of locking, access to 
phone resources when the phone was locked, the storage of user 
security credentials, the rigor of Android’s locking process, the 
number and enforcement of locking mechanisms, locking of data, 
and locking of the security menu. For these issues, while some 
users favored more liberal policies, others were encouraging 
stricter phone resource monitoring and locking. For instance, one 
user requested that the handset should be “locked without SIM 
only at the startup”, so that if a SIM is removed after the handset 
is fully started users should still have access to all phone 
resources, whereas another user went as far as requesting that 
Android devices should “randomly shuffle the keys in lockscreen 
pin screen” and “improve phone lock security establishing 
maximum number of intents”. Under the privacy keyword Table 7 
shows that there was less divergence, except for how unknown 
and private numbers are handled. We discuss these findings along 
with those presented above in the next section. 
 
Figure 3. Android privacy issues 
Table 6. Most regularly reported lock and secure privacy concerns 
Version Lock(%) Secure(%) 
 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
ICS 11(3.1) 5(4.0) 10(5.3) 5(3.6) 0(0) 2(9.5) 4(10.8) 4(13.8) 
JB 284(80.7) 91(70.2) 143(76.5) 112(81.8) 20(74.1) 15(71.4) 23(62.2) 18(62.1) 
KK 57(16.2) 30(23.8) 34(18.2) 20(14.6) 7(25.9) 4(19.0) 10(27.0) 7(24.1) 
ICS=Ice Cream Sandwich, JB=Jelly Bean, KK=KitKat, Scale 1=Does not work as intended, Scale 2=Violating constraint, Scale 3=Need for new feature, Scale 4= Does not work 
Table 7. Privacy-related competing concerns 
Terms 
Competing concerns 
(Grant versus Restrict) 
Examples 
Authentication Two factor authentication, System wide 
proxy authentication 
“Add a web sign in button to initial set up for two factor authentication users” <<>> 
“Android system wide proxy authentication” + “Enable proxy authentication for apps” 
Lock Lock mode, Start-up lock only if SIM 
absent, Face unlock, Restricted phone 
access when phone is locked, Make SIM 
pin accessible on device and reduce 
rigour of unlock process, Relax security 
for specific periods, Multi-lock, Number 
of intents, Lock screen timer, Data use, 
Security menu  
 “Ability to switch between pattern lock and classic lockscreen”  + “Make pin or password-
locked lockscreen optional when vpn is configured” <<>> “Two level unlock options” + 
“Unlock by voice” + “Face unlock and slide unlock and vpn” 
“Lock cellphone without sim only at the startup” <<>> “Improve phone lock security 
establishing maximum number of intents” + “Lock device after a number of fails when 
trying screen unlocking” + “Randomly shuffle the keys in lockscreen pin screen” 
“Face unlock: secondary picture” + “Ability to retain or save facial training for face unlock 
if switching to different unlock method” + “Option to skip face unlock” + “Face unlock user 
auto detect” <<>> “Implement fingerprint reading (via the touch screen) as a more secure 
alternative to face unlock” + “Face unlock: scan user's retinas with front camera as an added 
layer of security” 
“Ability to view read-only notifications on lock screen when protected with a 
pattern/passcode” + “Add camera to locked screen” + “Open custom applications from lock 
screen” + “Integrating music control on lockscreen” <<>> “Option to disable going to 
camera from lockscreen” + “Need a lock screen without widgets and without any possible 
actions on the status bar” + “Option to remove "power off" and "airplane mode" from 
lockscreen to enhance smartphone security.” 
“Enable slide unlock until timeout for pin, pattern, or password lock” <<>> “Improve 
encrypted device behavior: after 24h w/o unlocking assume stolen and do encrypted 
suspend to disk or power-off”  + “Option to wipe device after a number of incorrect 
unlocking attempts” + “Lock screen timer timeout to start after inactivity” + “Automatic 
data switch off on screen lock” + “Add unlock code to access in security menu” 
Privacy Unknown/private number “Allow blocking sms from unknown/private numbers” <<>> “Sms: enable private numbers 
and numbers as normal characters” 
5. DISCUSSION 
RQ1. What is the scale of confidentiality and privacy issues 
raised for the Android OS versions? The 1613 issues in our 
snapshot that were found to be related to confidentiality and 
privacy amount to less than one percent of the 17,776 issues that 
were recorded across the latter three Android releases, perhaps 
suggesting that such issues were infrequent, and therefore 
unimportant. However, given the critical nature of security-related 
concerns, the existence of any such issues could still negatively 
impact quality perceptions. This position is particularly supported 
by previous evidence that has noted that fixes for security issues 
take longer than those that were otherwise classified [12]. Of the 
four categories of codes that emerged from our content analysis 
process, we observed that the highest number of stakeholders’ 
issues was recorded to the “does not work as intended” category. 
Similarly, over 25% of the confidentiality and privacy issues 
logged on the Android issue tracker outlined stakeholders’ desires 
for new security features. We also note that there were more than 
twice as many privacy issues as confidentiality issues raised. This 
finding is revealing considering that Android users were 
previously held to be minimally aware of such issues [23]. 
Overall, we observed an increase in the number of stakeholders’ 
issues raised in the latter releases of the Android OS. We 
anticipate that this pattern may be linked to increasing capability 
and complexity of Android devices and their associated OSs, as 
well as to Android’s growing market share. For instance, the early 
T-Mobile G1 (Android 1.0) device possessed basic hardware and 
software capability, and had no on-screen keyboard or multi-touch 
capability, whereas the recent Nexus 5 (Android 4.4) provides 
these capabilities, along with advanced resource management and 
optimization (for CPU, memory and I/O), multi-mode processing, 
enhanced security and across-the-board application integration 
(e.g., Contacts, Gmail and SMS). However, this finding might 
also have been tempered, as latter Android releases were generally 
held to be more security-focused, including using the SELinux 
access control system (http://tinyurl.com/pyvb3he). 
RQ2. Are specific versions of Android OS more issue-prone than 
others? Our results show that some versions of the Android OS 
led to more issues being raised than others. From a confidentiality 
perspective, Android stakeholders were most concerned about 
access, their credentials and the management of permission to 
their phone resources over the three major releases considered 
(Ice Cream Sandwich, Jelly Bean and KitKat). In regard to 
privacy, stakeholders logged most issues about authentication, 
phone lock and their phone resources being secure, with phone 
lock issues being especially pronounced. Stakeholders recorded 
the most confidentiality and privacy issues over the Jelly Bean 
releases. The lock-related issues for “does not work as intended” 
and “does not work” were particularly dominant over Jelly Bean 
releases compared to Ice Cream Sandwich and KitKat. This 
pattern of higher prevalence of issues in Jelly Bean may be related 
to its higher level of usage [2, 24], and Android’s quest to deliver 
superior mobile capability to that offered by its competitors may 
also have impacted Google’s aggressive release cycles. Strikingly, 
however, there were many major bug fixes delivered as part of the 
Jelly Bean releases (http://tinyurl.com/pv79q5d). These fixes were 
probably influenced by the high level of end-user complaints, as 
seen in our results in terms of the number of issues that were 
reported over these versions. In addition, KitKat is installed on a 
larger cohort of Android devices than Jelly Bean 
(http://tinyurl.com/palhx7q/), which suggests that the latter 
versions of the OS were indeed potentially more problematic. 
RQ3. Are stakeholder views regarding confidentiality and privacy 
issues homogeneous or are they likely to create dilemmas for 
Android developers? Android stakeholders were not 
homogeneous in terms of their desire for confidentiality-related 
enhancements around access, login, password and permission. 
Rather, while some users were cautious about how access to their 
data is managed, others were less worried. This divergence could 
be problematic for those responsible for strategically directing 
Android’s offerings. In addition, this spread of preference also 
points to variation in end-users’ orientation and to varying levels 
of security awareness in the Android community [3, 25]. In fact, 
while some stakeholders’ requests are likely to create a problem 
for other users if these were implemented by Google (e.g., some 
users requested a feature to manage which apps are able to use the 
internet; however, the need to actually manage such a granular 
level of security could be annoying to others), others could create 
or heighten a device’s vulnerabilities (e.g., “automatic hotspot 
login”). We also observe variations in users’ willingness to be 
systematic, which could also create burdens for the Android 
community. For instance, while some stakeholders were happy to 
quickly access their device in its previous usable state should it be 
wiped, and so, wanted to download previously installed apps once 
acquiring the recently erased handset, others were more cautious, 
opting for a phased and controlled phone restore. This divergence 
also extended to the use of passwords. There is likelihood that a 
previously installed app(s) could have been the source of the 
security breaches that resulted in the phone wipe in the first 
instance, and thus, a hasty reinstallation could be ill-advised. 
We also observed some conflicting privacy-related requests, 
particularly those related to authentication, lock and privacy. 
While some users requested enhancements to Android’s 
authentication process, favoring a two stage approach, another set 
of users was in favor of simpler proxy-based authentication, 
potentially creating similar dilemmas to those mentioned above. 
In fact, under the lock category there was divergence in terms of 
lock mode, the level of locking, access to phone resources when 
the phone is locked, the storage of user security credentials, the 
rigor of Android’s locking process, the number and enforcement 
of locking mechanisms, locking of data, and locking of the 
security menu. In terms of competing concerns for the 
management of permission, there was greater leaning towards 
granular permission management. Although some users were less 
strict, others felt that more granular permission management 
would increase user confidence. Others were also promoting the 
idea of reversing previously granted permissions and overriding 
some default requested permissions during app installation. 
The management of permissions has been shown to challenge 
most mobile users [3], and so the demand for additional 
management control seems impractical. However, perhaps the 
power to override previously granted permissions may be helpful 
to (some) stakeholders. Such a move would assume awareness of 
resource violations, however, and it has been shown that on many 
occasions users are unaware of malicious software exploiting their 
resources [25]. One alternative would be for a centralized audit to 
be performed by Google from time to time, to assess phone 
activity logs for malicious activity. Through such an audit 
malicious software may then be flagged or removed. While this 
will require internet (data) usage and remote access to devices, 
users may trade-off such issues with the increased security that 
would result. Of course recent efforts by Google to add a face 
unlock feature (in Ice Cream Sandwich), data usage analysis 
monitors (in Jelly Bean) and modular update (in Jelly Bean), 
would also reduce security threats, thereby improving Android’s 
quality. We examine these issues further in Section 7. 
6. THREATS TO VALIDITY 
While we have examined an important topic area, and have 
provided insights into Android OS’s confidentiality and privacy 
issues, there are shortcomings to this work that may affect its 
generalizability.  We consider these in turn. 
Although the Android issue tracker is publicly hosted, and so is 
likely to capture most of the community’s concerns [13], issues 
may also be informally communicated to and addressed within the 
development teams at Google. Similarly, unreported issues are not 
captured by our analysis. We also focused as far as possible to 
include all terms and their synonyms to examine the concepts that 
were under consideration [6]. However, we accept that there is a 
possibility that we could have missed some relevant terms. That 
said, the convergence of our results (revealed through multiple 
contextual analysis techniques) triangulated our classification 
scheme, and suggests that our approach was generally robust. In 
fact, our reliability assessment measure revealed excellent 
agreement between coders, suggesting that our findings benefitted 
from accuracy, precision and objectivity [20]. 
We separated the issues based on the dates of the major Android 
OS releases. Given that device manufacturers have been shown to 
delay upgrading their hardware with recent Android OS releases 
[26], there is a possibility that some issues reported between 
specific releases were in fact related to earlier releases. However, 
this misalignment was not detected during our contextual analysis, 
suggesting that our approach appropriately classified issues. 
Finally, although the issue trackers of many mobile OSs are not 
publicly available, and the distribution of these OSs’ issues may 
not be similar to what is observed in this work for the Android 
OS, mobile OSs such as Microsoft Windows, Apple iOS, 
Symbian and BlackBerry are all likely to follow release-
maintenance cycles similar to that of Android OS in order to 
remain competitive in the market. 
7. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our findings in this work have implications for Android 
community stakeholders.  For instance, with Google’s release of 
the Nexus 4 for KitKat (and Nexus 5, 6 and 9 for Android 
Lollipop released on June 25, 2014), developers are likely to give 
priority to fixes on these OS versions given the need to quickly 
address stakeholder concerns on the new platforms. Thus, older 
devices that continue to be shipped with Ice Cream Sandwich and 
Jelly Bean are likely to inherit any reported security 
vulnerabilities if these are not explicitly addressed. While there 
were few reported threats for Ice Cream Sandwich releases, the 
opposite was seen after the releases of Jelly Bean. Thus, Android 
end-users should take this into consideration when acquiring new 
devices. Perhaps a valid strategy for remedial work by Google 
developers should be to prioritize issues regarding features that 
“do not work as intended” and those that “do not work”. In fact, 
although small relative to the number of issues that were reported 
for Android overall, a strategy that focuses on addressing security 
issues should help to instill stakeholders’ confidence in the quality 
of the Android product range. Our evidence suggests that phone 
lock and access, user credentials and the management of handsets’ 
permissions would be useful areas for consideration in Google’s 
maintenance strategy. Stakeholders are also expressing growing 
concern about phone restrictions for the recent KitKat release, and 
so this issue should similarly be given priority. 
Our evidence suggests that, in terms of expanding Android OS 
security features, Google may face dilemmas in deciding to whose 
views they should assign most weight. We observed that while 
some users were cautious about how access to their device 
resources is managed, others were less worried, in fact requesting 
relaxed security procedures. This divergence in preferences 
presents competing concerns among users, and so would need to 
be carefully managed to satisfy Android’s diverse user cohort. 
Perhaps a strategy to provide users with basic default security 
settings, with the power to configure additional security features if 
needed or desired, would provide the best balance. Such an 
arrangement would allow those who are more security-conscious 
to enact rigorous controls to protect their privacy, while others 
who are less concerned may accept minimum security settings. 
For example, for the “phone restore after wiping” issue, while 
some stakeholders were happy to quickly access their device in its 
previous usable state, others were more cautious, opting for a 
phased and controlled phone restore. Thus, a routine that allows 
users to configure either of these options would satisfy both 
groups. In the same way, a strategy that enables users to configure 
whether or not to enforce “password protection of mobile 
purchases and mobile device shutdown” would satisfy both 
groups’ desires. Furthermore, such strategies could be 
supplemented by the power to override previously granted 
permissions along with centralized audits performed by Google 
for malicious activity in order to remove such threats. 
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